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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XVII FEBRUARY, 1932 No. 2
THE CENSORSHIP OF RADICAL MATERIALS BY THE
POST OFFICE
BY MoRRis E. COHN
The mails are the arteries of current intelligence. In its
function of transmitting newspapers, the postal service is an in-
tellectual link between each individual and the sources of infor-
mation and critical opinion. The powerful influence of the press
in moulding public opinion and in education has so often been
recognized as to demand no repetition here. It is sufficient to
observe only that so efficient a means of reaching each individual
with such new and vital matter from so many different sources
has never been known before the development of the modern
newspaper. It follows therefore that the Federal Government,
with its wide power over the mails, holds the pulse of the nation
in its control.
"The democratic genie is out of the bottle; it cannot be put
back." The will of the people, theoretically, is sovereign.
The shaping of that will is greatly in the hands of the Federal
Government by means of its control of the mails, for it can dic-
tate what political intelligence may be disseminated and what
may not. In effect, the dominion is an intellectual one. Assum-
ing that the majority of the people have signified their will
through Congress, and that the legislative body has responded
by passing certain laws concerning the transmission of matter
through the mails, it follows from what has been said concern-
ing current intelligence and the shaping of public opinion, that
the opinions of the majority may be forced upon the minority.
The stimulus to thought and action which is furnished any na-
tion by a dissenting minority is of the highest importance. Any
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power which the majority may have for the restriction of dis-
sent is an exceedingly dangerous weapon and deserves careful
examination. The undeniable fact that the assumption of this
power has been progressive during the last half-century, so that
now it has reached proportions which were scarcely in the minds
of the framers of the Constitution, indicates a tendency in the
growth -of the law which deserves careful consideration.
A study of the language of the First Amendment, "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press," indicates, it would seem, a desire to change the
order of a day when the interests of the sovereign power were
not identical with those of the governed,1 to one more in har-
mony with the ideal of a democratic government. In spirit, if
not in so many words, the Amendment expresses an abhorrence
of censorship other than that competition which all truth must
undergo in the market-place. Judging by the extensive, "the
practically plenary power of Congress over the mails,"' 2 the
pendulum of opinion seems to have completed its arc. The laws
that permit of such a powerful Censor are worth consideration,
if not to question their wisdom, then at least to contemplate
their present extent and to attempt to prophesy their full stature
in the future.
I.
The Supreme Court has upheld the power of the Postmaster-
General to attack radical periodicals in the following two man-
ners: he may forbid the use of the mails for the issue of the
publication which contains the objectionable material; or-and
this second power is far more drastic-he may revoke the second-
class mailing privileges for all issues of the publication, future
as well as present. These two powers, obviously, are distinct:
one of them is a complete denial of the use of a Federal agency;
the other is simply an increase in price for the use of that
agency. They will be discussed separately.
Hobbes, LEVIATHAN, c. 18. Beard, AmERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLI-
TICS, makes reference (page 19) to a statute "in the days of Merry King
Hal for abolishing diversity of opinion"; 26 Henry VIII Cap. 13 (1535) is
apparently a typical statute, making it treason to express an opinion, among
other things, which would deprive the King of his dignity.
2 Mr. Justice Clarke in Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson (1921) 255 U. S.
407
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The power to exclude radical matter from the mails depends
on an Act of Congress, popularly known as the Espionage Act.3
One section declares,
Every letter, writing, circular, post-card, print, engraving,
newspaper, pamphlet, book or other publication, matter or
thing, containing any matter advocating or urging treason,
insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United
States
to be nonmailable. Another section 4 declares any writing in
violation of Title 50, Sections 31 to 42 and 191 to 194 (as well
as some others not pertinent here) likewise to be nonmailable.
The essence of these latter sections is to make unlawful the dis-
closure of information concerning national defense, and, in time
of war, either to make false reports with intent to interfere with
the military, or wilfully to cause insubordination, disloyalty,
mutiny, refusal of duty, or wilfully to obstruct recruiting or en-
listment services to the injury of the service of the United
States. An interpretation of these provisions as a whole indi-
cates that there are two large classes of nonmailable matter. In
one class, the quality of being nonmailable is dependent solely
upon the contents of the material; this is the class provided for
by Section 344 and that portion of Section 343 which refers to a
disclosure of national defense. Such information, it might be
said, is inherently treasonable in character, and it is therefore
made nonmailable regardless of any other facts. In the second
class, the quality of being nonmailable is dependent upon the
content in view of an external condition, that is, whether the na-
tion is or is not at war. The information in this latter class is
considered, apparently, to be of such a character that it is dan-
gerous only when the nation is at war. These distinctions are
important, for they indicate the greater power exercised in time
of war than when the nation is at peace. They indicate that at
present, when much of Section 343 has little application, Con-
gress has signified its permission of a greater range of expres-
sion and a freer exercise of that critical faculty, which is the
theoretical star of democracy. These regulations indicate
further, perhaps, that the people have recognized (as did the
40 Stat. 583 (1917), 18 U. S. C. secs. 343, 344. The Espionage Act was
passed June 15, 1917.
4 18 U. S. C. see. 344.
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ancient Romans) the inadequacy of the democratic ideal during
perilous times, and have yielded to a greater centralization of
control.
In the feverish days of war following the passage of this Act,
the rational interpretation of it by the Courts was an extremely
difficult matter. It is probably fair to say that the judicial busi-
ness of applying the Act to the cases as they arose was no cool
weighing of language, no use of the prophetic vision which
should characterize so important and honored a tribunal as the
Federal judiciary. One of the first problems to be solved was:
what statements are condemned? Language is a subtle device,
and is so yielding that many readers may sincerely arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions from the same group of words. Recognizing
the extreme flexibility of the medium of language what state-
ments did Congress wish to declare nonmailable?
When Masses Publication Co. v. PattenA reached the courts, a
month after the passage of the Espionage Act, the problem was
attacked by Judge Hand with a degree of clarity which was
most unique in those hectic days. This was a suit for an injunc-
tion by the Publishing Company against Patten, Postmaster of
the City of New York. The July issue of a periodical had been
denied the use of the mails because it was alleged to contain
nonmailable matter; and the Company sought to restrain the
Postmaster from refusing to accept the magazine for the mails.
Judge Hand granted the writ. There were presented a number
of issues which are not our immediate concern, but on the extent
to which language might go in advocating resistance to the draft
laws, the Court reached the following conclusion:
If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their
duty to resist the law, one should not be held to have at-
tempted to cause its violation. If that be not the test, I can
see no escape from the conclusion that under this section
every political agitation which can be shown to be apt to
create a seditious temper is illegal. I am confident that by
such language Congress had no such revolutionary purpose
in view.
Such an interpretation leaves the door open for wholesome
public criticism. It permits the free discussion of the wisdom
or oppression of a law. It permits the governed to examine, to
5 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1917) 244 F. 535.
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question, and to conclude, if such be the case, that a law is un-
wise. It permits even a condemnation of a law. But at that
point it stops. It forbids the speaker to advise or urge a viola-
tion of it. Judge Hand undoubtedly was aware of the implica-
tions of such a conclusion. He must have been aware of the fact
that he was wisely permitting that intellectual ferment which
precedes the repeal of a bad law. To have concluded otherwise
would be, in effect, to say, "Yes, you may think and question, so
long as you confine your questioning to the unspoken word.
Once you formulate into communicable ideas your opinions, you
must commend, you may only praise." That is the doctrine of
stagnation. It is unfortunate that the Appellate Court reversed
Judge Hand on this question.
Another problem of the interpretation of language in the dis-
puted matter was discussed by the lower Court. What is a "wil-
fully false statement"? At what point does an opinion, how-
ever violent in its terms and positive in its assertion, become a
false statement of fact? It is obvious that previous adjudica-
tions of similar questions in connections with fraud and contract
would not necessarily be applicable here. Judge Hand at-
tempted to mark the line of cleavage by saying that a wilfully
false statement "properly includes only a statement of fact
which the utterer knows to be false." Statements of opinion be-
lieved to be true by the speaker "fall within the scope of that
right to criticize either by temperate reasoning or indecent in-
vective, which is normally the privilege of the individual in a
government dependent upon the free expression of opinion as
the ultimate source of authority. The argument may be trivial
in substance and violent or perverse in manner, but so long as it
is confined to abuse of existing policies or laws, it is impossible
to class it as a false statement of facts of the kind in question."6
Such was the liberal attitude of Judge Hand. The Espionage
6 In United States v. Baker (D. C. D. Md. 1917) 247 F. 124, decided July
11, 1917, when the Espionage Act was enforced, but before the Masses case
was heard, the following language was used in connection with a conspiracy
to induce a violation of the Draft Law: "Every man has a perfect right to
ony opinion he may see fit to form about any proposed law, or about any
law that is on the statute books . . . he may make any argument that
commends itself to his reason and judgment against the policy of any par-
ticular law . . And he is not answerable for the wisdom of his argu-
ments. . ."
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Act was in the nature of a penal statute. The Judge construed
it strictly and left unimpeded as much of the right of free speech
as was possible."
The Government took an appeal from the lower Court's deci-
sion, and in November of the same year, the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals8 rendered a decision which reversed the decree of the Dis-
trict Court, and changed the construction of the Espionage Act
with reference to nonmailable matter.
Whether a statement actually urged a violation of the law or
was merely critical; whether the matter was opinion or wilfully
false statement; these questions seem to have been considered
not relevant to a correct interpretation of the Act. The question
was, the Court said, what was the effect of the language used?
7The following are portions of the more objectionable matters. In an
editorial, entitled, "A Question," this was said: "I would like to know how
many men and women there are in America who admire self-reliance and
sacrifice of those who are resisting the conscription law on the ground that
they believe it violates the sacred rights and liberties of man. How many
of the American population are in accord with the American press when it
speaks of the arrest of these men of genuine courage as a 'Round-up of
Slackers'? Are there none to whom this picture of the American republic
adopting toward its citizens the attitude of a rider toward cattle is appal-
ling? I recall the essays of Emerson, the poems of Walt Whitman, which
sounded a call never heard before in the world's literature, for erect and in-
suppressible individuality, the courage of solitary faith and heroic assertion
of self. It was America's contribution to the ideals of man. . . I won-
der if the number is few to whom this high resolve was the distinction of
our American idealism, and who feel inclined to bow their heads to those
who are going to jail under the whip of the state, because they will not do
what they do not believe in doing. Perhaps there are enough of us, if we
make ourselves heard in voice and letter, to modify this ritual of content in
the daily press, and induce the American government to undertake the im-
prisonment of heroic young men with a certain sorrowful dignity that will
be new to the world."
A poem, entitled "Tribute," referred to two who had just been convicted
for inducing persons not to register under the Conscription Act. It read,
in part:
"Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman
Are in prison tonight,
But they have made themselves elemental forces.
Like the water that climbs down rocks,
Like the wind in the leaves,
Like the gentle night that holds us,
They are working on our destinies,
They are forging the love of nations."
8 (C. C. A. 2, 1917) 246 F. 24.
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If the natural and reasonable effect of what is said is to
encourage resistance to a law, and the words are used in an
endeavour to persuade to resistance, it is immaterial that
the duty to resist is not mentioned, or the interest of the
persons addressed in resistance is not suggested. That one
may wilfully obstruct the enlistment service, without advis-
ing in direct language against enlistments, and without stat-
ing that to refrain from enlistments is a duty or in one's in-
terest, seems to us too plain for controversy. . . "Ora-
tio obliqua has always been preferred by rhetoricians to
oratio recta."9
The distinction between such an interpretation and that of the
District Court is that while the latter examined, grammatically
and logically, the material itself to determine whether it was
mailable, the Court of Appeals examined the language to deter-
mine its probable effect on an audience.10 This was a step to-
ward the "rule of reason" later enunciated by the Supreme
Court, but because it was a half-step, a faulty approach to the
wisdom of the Supreme Court rule, it left the law in a danger-
ous state. For the rules of grammar and the syllogism more
nearly approach mathematical precision; they cannot be bent
and twisted by a jury, incensed by patriotic speeches, as easily
9 The Court refers to the case of Regina v. Sharpe (1848) 3 Cox C. C. 288,
as a basis for its decision that language short of advice is nevertheless a
crime if its effect is to incite the audience to a violation of the law. But in
that case the report does not indicate what was the language of the defend-
ant. And it is at least as fair, from a reading of the case, to conclude that
actual exhortation was used by the speaker. Furthermore, since the great
and obvious restriction on the interpretation of the Espionage Act is the
First Amendment to the Constitution, an English case is doubtful authority,
at best.
10 The case of Jeffersonian Pub. Co. v. West (D. C. S. D. Ga. 1917) 245 F.
585, was decided in August, 1917, without any reference to the Masses case,
previously adjudicated in the District Court. (Nor does this decision refer
to any other case for that matter.) From the inflamed language of the
opinion, rising at times to heights of poetic confusion, it is difficult to see
whether any analysis, such as concerned the judges in the Masses case, was
attempted. However, the general tendency of the decision seems to be that
the effect of the language is the sole criterion of its being nonmailable. The
publisher, as in the Masses case, asked for an injunction. The Court denied
the writ on the questionable ground that the plaintiff, on account of the na-
ture of the matter published, did not come into court with clean hands. In
Gitlow v. Kiely (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 227, the question was
thus presented by counsel and accepted by the Court as presenting the is-
sue: "Can any reasonable man hold that any individual or group of indi-
viduals are urged to forcible action by reading of this paper?"
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as any unformulated rule which might determine the probable
effect of the language on an audience.
The language of the Court, though not expressly considering
the question of intent, indicates that the Espionage Act covers
only wilful utterances, deliberately planned. It is significant,
though certainly not conclusive, that in an action for conspiracy
to induce a violation of the Selective Draft Law,11 a directed
verdict was ordered by the Court because the government failed
to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants intended
to persuade men not to register. Intent, undoubtedly, is a nec-
essary element in a criminal prosecution for a viplation of the
Espionage Act. 12 Because Section 33, Title 50, makes intent a
necessary element of its violation; and because Section 343,
Title 18, makes nonmailable such matter as is in violation of the
former Section, the logical inference could be that to be nonmail-
able under this Section, the matter must have been written with
the unlawful intention. However, the rules which govern the
mailing of obscene matters are otherwise. For, in regard to
criminal liability, though knowledge of the nature of the article
mailed is a necessary element of the crime,13 the intent or motive
of the defendant is irrelevant. 14 And in determining whether a
disputed article is within the prohibition of the statutes forbid-
ding the mailing of obscene material, no reference is necessary
to the intention of the person who mails it. Only the effect of
the matter need be considered.1 5 Whether a court would hold
that matter, to be nonmailable under the Espionage Act, must
have been written with that intention which is necessary for
criminal liability in an academic question, no decisions having
beeii found on that point. It is submitted, however, that judg-
ing by the analogy of the cases on obscenity and by the practical
11 United States v. Baker, above.
12United States v. Kraft (C. C. A. 3, 1918) 249 F. 919; but see Abrams
v. United States (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 624, for discussion of intent in dis-
senting opinion by Holmes and Brandeis, JJ.
13 Price v. United States (1897) 165 U. S. 311; Rosen v. United States
(1896) 161 U. S. 29; Konda v. United States (C. C. A. 7, 1908) 166 F. 91.
14Knowles v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1909) 170 F. 409; United States
v. Slenker (D. C. W. D. Va. 1887) 32 F. 691.
"5 Lynch v. United States (C. C. A. 7, 1922) 285 F. 162 (pictures of a
nude woman); Burton v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1906) 142 F. 57; United
States v. Smith (D. C. E. D. Wis. 1891) 45 F. 476; United States v. Ches-
man (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1881) 19 F. 497.
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aspect of the situation, the criminal intent of the writer ought
not be considered in determining the nonmailable quality of
disputed matter, though the strict logic of the language of the
statutes seems to indicate otherwise.
In March, 1919, the Supreme Court first expressed itself on
the Espionage Act. The case of Schenk v. United States' 6 was
a criminal prosecution for a conspiracy to violate the Act. The
defendants contended that the language of the circular in ques-
tion was protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution.
It, therefore, became the duty of the Court to state how far the
privilege of free speech was protected by the Constitution, and
beyond what point it was within the power of Congress to en-
force criminal liability for verbal expression. Mr. Justice
Holmes delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court; and, on this
issue, he said,
The question in every case is whether the words are used in
such circumstances as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Con-
gress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree.
These sentences contain the boundaries of free speech, as
marked out by the Supreme Court. Within these limits--and
they are tolerably wide-anything may be said. Beyond that,
is the Espionage Act and the power of Congress to provide
punishment.
These limitations are complex. They include:
1. A consideration of the words themselves, in view of
2. An extraneous situation of such a nature, that the
words will create a danger to bring about
3. The substantive evils which Congress has a right to
prevent. 17
Since the right to perpetual existence is inherent in a sov-
ereignty, the Espionage Act, having for its purpose the success
of the United States in the war, falls within the third limitation.
A pamphlet urging the overthrow of the present system of edu-
16 (1919) 249 U. S. 47.
17 In Schaefer v. United States (1920) 251 U. S. 467, the questions were
in fact, held for the jury. Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented on this
issue, and declared that these questions were for the Judge to decide before
submitting the facts of the writing to the jury.
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cation for example, is beyond that limitation, because education
is not the proper business of Congress. Whether the act alleged
to be criminal falls within the first two limitations depends in
each case upon the words themselves and upon the existing po-
litical situation.
It must be observed that this "rule of reason" (so denomi-
nated in a later case by Mr. Justice Brandeis) was declared by
the Court in a criminal prosecution. Whether it would be ap-
plied in a determination of the mailable quality of a writing can
be only a matter of inference. Certain it is that the limitation
would be at least as great; for the tendency of the courts is to
permit a greater freedom of action before delivering a verdict
in a criminal proceeding than in, for example, a suit for money
damages. Whether the individual is punished criminally or not is
an academic question, the effect in either case being equally to
deny mail privileges. In either case the question is whether
there has been a denial of a civil right or privilege, in itself an
unusual punishment; in either case a fundamental constitutional
right is to be determined. To allow a wide degree of liberal in-
terpretation, it is submitted, would have ample legal justifi-
cation.
One more touchstone for the analysis of language was urged
on the Court and rejected. The defendants contended, in the
same case, that in the absence of proof of the actual effect of the
language, the indictment must fail. The Court held otherwise. 18
If the writing, its tendency, and the intent of the defendants are
the same, the success of their venture is immaterial. However,
the question of whether a writing is nonmailable must be de-
cided, in most cases, before the disputed matter has had an op-
portunity to affect its readers. The actual effect of a writing,
therefore, can hardly have a bearing in determining what is non-
mailable matter, except in the case, to be considered later, where
the second class mailing privilege is revoked on the strength of
past, as well as present, publications.19
18 This was the holding in previous cases in the Federal courts. Kitch-
ener v. United States (C. C. A. 4, 1918) 255 F. 301; O'Hare v. United
States (C. C. A. 8, 1915) 253 F. 538; contra, United States v. Hall (D. C. D.
Mont. 1918) 248 F. 150.
19 The Shenck case was followed in Frohwerk v. United States (1919) 249
U. S. 204; Debs v. United States (1919) 249 U. S. 211; Abrams v. United
States, above.
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A brief recapitulation indicates that statements, true as well
as false, advice, opinion, and exhortation, have all been held to
be nonmailable. The question depends in part on the existing
political situation and in part on the probable effect of the lan-
guage used. The intent of the writer that the matter have a
seditious effect, as well as the actual effect of the writing, is no
concern of the Postmaster. The question is one of the creation
of a danger to the existence of those rights which Congress may
protect. And, acting as it did, after the legislative body had
passed the law, and after former decisions had recognized the
power of control in Congress, the Supreme Court reached what
was probably as liberal an interpretation as was possible. The
wisdom of the action of Congress is a totally different matter,
as is likewise the Supreme Court's decision concerning second
class mailing privileges. But that decision did not concern the
definition of nonmailable matter.
II.
Let us assume, then, that the Postmaster, by a judicious appli-
cation of the language of the Supreme Court, has decided that
the matter in question is in violation of the Espionage Act. The
matter, therefore, is "nonmailable"; the publication, or, if it is a
newspaper, the issue, may not be sent through the mails; and
the person responsible is subject to fine and imprisonment. Such
is the obvious meaning of the statutes.
Whoever shall use or attempt to use the mail or Postal
Service of the United States for the transmission of any
matter declared by sections 343 and 344 of this title to be
nonmailable, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.20
The exclusion from the mails of the particular matter has
most often been the result in these cases.
However, that has not been the only result. The Postmaster
has exercised a power, compared to which a casual exclusion is
so puny as almost to be negligible. The case of United States
ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Company v.
20 40 Stat. 231 (1917), 18 U. S. C. sec. 345; compare similar provisions in
regard to obscenity, 36 Stat. 339 (1911), 18 U. S. C. sec. 334; lottery, 35
Stat. 1129 (1909), 18 U. S. C. sec. 336.
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Bur eson2l is one about which it is difficult to write dispassion-
ately. This case, if the writer may be so bold, is the epitome of
contrast between a majority opinion which is difficult to stom-
ach, both for its impolicy and illogic, and an admirable dissent-
ing opinion.
In September of 1917, while the United States was at war, an
order was issued by the Postmaster revoking the second class
mailing privileges of the relator, a Socialist newspaper. The
charge was that articles were appearing in relator's paper which
were in violation of the Espionage Act, and which rendered it
nonmailable. A hearing was had, and on appeal to the Postmas-
ter-General the order was approved. Thereupon a petition for
mandamus was filed, asking that the Postmaster-General be
compelled to annul his order and restore to the paper the second
class privilege. On demurrer and appeal the case reached the
Supreme Court. The rule was discharged, and the order of the
Postmaster-General affirmed.
Thus did the Court reason: the privilege of second class mail
involves an extremely low postage rate, about one-seventh the
actual cost for such carriage; this privilege is based on "the his-
toric policy of encouraging by low rates the dissemination of
current intelligence." It is a special favor extended to publish-
ers because it is supposed to contribute to public welfare. Be-
cause it is a special privilege, it is only for those publications
which carry mailable matter, and that is the assumption upon
which the privilege is granted ". . . if the newspaper of
the relator had become to be so edited that it contained other
than mailable matter, plainly it was the intention of Congress
that it should no longer be. carried as second class matter, and
therefore the order to revoke the permit which had been granted
to the relator was proper and justified.. ."
The articles complained of began shortly after the war and
made a regular appearance. Their attitude was pacific; they
denounced war in all its phases-food control; the "rubber-
stamp Congress"; the economic bases of war; et cetera. But the
Court held that proof that a paper contains matter of this char-
acter indicates an intention to publish nonmailable matter. On
the basis of a lack of intention to comply with the laws, the
21 (1919) 255 U. S. 407.
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Postmaster may revoke the second class privilege. In this man-
ner, by narrowly limiting its outlook to such steps in the reason-
ing process which would lead to an affirmation of the Postmas-
ter's order, the Court reached its decision.
The decision seems open to obvious criticism. Wherein is
the logical connection between nonmailable matter and the
second class privilege? If the issue contains nonmailable mat-
ter, is it not, and it alone, excluded from the mails? The deci-
sion above seems to indicate that by a payment of the first class
rates the matter would become mailable. Such a holding would
be absurd. In what manner does a violation of the Espionage
Act justify a demand for higher postal rates for all future issues
of the publication? Did the Court deliberately shut its eyes to
the fact that the Postmaster's order shut down the presses of the
publication?
All of these questions are considered in the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurred in, in the main, by Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes:
This case presents no legal question peculiar to war. It
is important, because what we decide may determine in
large measure whether in times of peace our press shall be
free.
The denial to a newspaper of entry as second class mail,
or the revocation of an entry previously made, does not deny
to the paper admission to the mail; nor does it deprive the
publisher of any mail facility. It merely deprives him of
the very low postal rates, and compels him to pay postage
for the same service at the rate called third class, which
was, until recently, from eight to fifteen times as high as the
second class rate . . t The question presented is: Did
Congress confer upon the Postmaster-Oeneral authority to
deny second class postal rates on that ground [that is, the
inclusion of nonmailable matter].
No such authority is granted in terms in the stat-
utes which declare what matter shall be nonmailable. Is
there any provision in the postal laws from which the inten-
tion of Congress to grant such power may be inferred?
After reviewing the facts in the case,
It further appears that the Postmaster-General, in the
exercise of a supposed discretion, refused to carry at second
class mail rates all future issues of the Milwaukee Leader,
solely because he believed it systematically violated the
Espionage Act in the past. It further appears that the be-
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lief rested partly upon the contents of past issues filed with
the return, and partly upon "representations and complaints
from sundry good and loyal citizens" whose statements are
not incorporated in this record, and which do not appear to
have been called to the attention of the publisher of the Mil-
waukee Leader at the hearing or otherwise. It is this gen-
eral refusal to accept the paper for transmission at the sec-
ond class mail rates which is challenged as being without
warrant in law.
The first question considered is whether, on the basis of past
data, a publication may in the future be excluded from the mails.
No such authority is anywhere granted to the Postmaster by
Congress. Objectionable matter, deposited in the mails, may be
rejected. But that is vastly different from an exclusion extend-
ing indefinitely into the future and relating to matter not yet
printed.
If such a power were possessed by the Postmaster-Gen-
eral, he would, in view of the practical finality of his deci-
sion, become the universal censor of publications. For a
denial of the use of the mails would be for most of them,
tantamount to a denial of the right of circulation.
The conclusion, therefore, is that such a future exclusion
should be invalid. But the Postmaster did not claim such a
power; he asserted that the mails were still open upon the pay-
ment of other and higher rates. He contended that the second
class mail is a privilege which it is in his discretion to deny.
That contention is the second problem to be considered: has
the Postmaster-General the power to deny a publisher the second
class rate?
The Mail Classification Act,22 provides that a newspaper, to be
mailable at the second class rates, must be issued at least four
times a year, at stated intervals, for the dissemination of infor-
mation of a public character. Does a violation of the Espionage
Act cause a paper to be no longer "regularly issued" or "not pub-
lished for the dissemination of information of a public char-
acter"? Obviously not. The Classification Act is concerned
only with rates, not with punishment of crimes, or with the pro-
priety of matter contained. If it is a bad newspaper, the Act
22 20 Stat. 359 (1879), 39 U. S. C. sec. 226.
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which makes it illegal, and not the Classification Act, provides
for the punishment.
The contention that the second class rate is a special privilege
may be conceded. But it is not the Postmaster's to bestow.
Its beneficiaries are defined by the Classification Act, and Post-
master-General does not have the power to vary its terms.
Again the power of revoking the second class privilege raises
a series "of grave constitutional doubts," among which are the
deprivation of property, for in effect the presses are rendered
mute and useless; denial of due process; administration of un-
usual punishment (denial of use of the mails) ; and, chiefly,
abridgement of the freedom of the press; for, as was stated in
Ex parte Jackson,2 3 "liberty of circulation is as essential to that
freedom [of the press] as liberty of publishing; indeed, without
circulation the publication would be of little value." "It is
argued," continues Mr. Justice Brandeis, "that although a news-
paper is barred from second class mail, liberty of circulation is
not denied; because the first and third class mail and also other
means of transportation are left open. Constitutional rights
should not be frittered away by arguments so technical and un-
substantial."
The remainder of the opinion deals with the impolicy of such
an order; the practical creation of an intellectual despot; the
imposing of a fine, by increase of postal rates, by an administra-
tive act; and many others.
After such an exhaustive opinion, there is little left to add.
The weakness of the logic of the majority opinion is plain. Only
one thing more might be shown, and that is the effect of the ex-
ercise of this power. It is obvious that if the newspaper in
question depends a great deal for its revenue upon circulation
outside its own city-and since revenue from advertising is
measured by circulation-its presses would be silenced. The
payment of higher postal rates for a newspaper, the price of
which is measured in pennies, must operate to remove it from
the field of competition to make way for other newspapers-
those whose editorial policy has the political approval of Con-
gress and the Postal Department. In effect, this most drastic
power permits the Postmaster-General to silence a newspaper
- (1877) 96 U. S. 722.
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and put it out of business, if its editorial policy has led him to be-
lieve that it no longer intends to print only mailable matter.
III.
In the statutes regulating nonmailability no distinction is
made explicitly between the various classes of mail. Yet there
can be no doubt that the sphere intended to be regulated was the
vast field of newspapers and periodicals. Still less reason is
there to doubt that, whatever the intention of Congress, the field
wherein the statutes are most operative is the field of the period-
ical and newspaper.
It is not beyond the power of Congress to pass a law regulat-
ing the content of sealed matter, yet such mail is, for all prac-
tical purposes, beyond the reach of the Congressional arm. The
same statute which declares certain writings nonmailable24 rec-
ognizes an existing right which impedes the complete operation
of that law.
* but no person other than an employee of the Dead
Letter office, duly authorized thereto, or other person upon
a search warrant authorized by law, shall be authorized to
open any letter not addressed to himself.
Until the Fourth Amendment shall have been changed or in-
terpreted away to a point even beyond the shadowy existence of
the wartime "freedom of speech," the content of sealed matter
is, in practice, untouched by the laws of Congress.
No law of Congress can place in the hands of the officials
connected with the postal service any authority to invade
the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail;
and all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind
must be in subordination to the great principle embodied in
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.26
The effect, therefore, of the Espionage Act, so far as it con-
cerns nonmailable matter, is to establish a censorship over news-
papers and periodicals. Insofar as the Act may be interpreted
to exclude condemnation of existing laws and to permit only
2440 Stat. 230 (1917), 18 U. S. C. sec. 343.
25Ex parte Jackson (1877) 96 U. S. 722; see also Weeks v. United States
(1914) 232 U. S. 385; United States v. Jones (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1916) 230
F. 262.
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laudatory criticism, thus far has Congress drafted the press to
wage its wars. Thus far has the majority attempted to exercise
its intellectual dominion over any dissenting minority.
IV.
Any discussion of the constitutionality of Congressional con-
trol of the mails must be either historical or academic, as this
question has been repeatedly answered by the United States Su-
preme Court. A rapid survey of the tendency of the decisions
might indicate the limits, if any, of this power.
The Constitutional grant of control is a meager matter of seven
words. In enumerating the powers of Congress, there is in-
cluded the power "to establish Post Offices and post Roads." In
1789 Congress proceeded to act in accordance with this power.26
No question arose concerning the existence of this power or its
extent until 1836, when President Jackson sought to procure the
passage of a law excluding inflammatory slave-literature from
the mails. Calhoun, chairman of the committee selected to con-
sider the subject, reported that Congress had not the power to
enact such a law because it would abridge the freedom of the
press. The bill therefore failed.27
Following this, however, Congress assumed the power and
passed laws excluding obscene matter2 8 and matter pertaining to
lotteries. 29 In a prosecution for violation of lottery laws, Ex
parte Jackson, the question first came to the Supreme Court.
The defendant contended that the control granted to Congress
by the Constitution was a mechanical one, and referred only to
the regulation of physical characteristics of mail matter, such as
weight, size, and shape. The Court held the Lottery Act not in
conflict with the Constitution and valid.
The validity of legislation prescribing what should be
carried, and its weight and form, and the charges to which
it should be subjected, has never been questioned. What
should be mailable has varied at different times, changing
with the facility of transportation over postroads.
28 1 Stat. 70; this provided for the establishment of a temporary post of-
fice. Ten years later the system was fully established. 1 Stat. 733-741
(1799).
27 12 Debates of Congress 704, 754, 771.
21 17 Stat. 598 (1873), 18 U. S. C. see. 512.
-" 19 Stat. 90 (1876), 18 U. S. C. sees. 334 and 336.
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The power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation
of the entire postal system of the country. The right to
designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the
right to determine what shall be excluded...
Thus far the opinion speaks only of mechanical control.
The Court's attention was called to the discussion in President
Jackson's time. And to this the Court replied that Calhoun's
opinion, that exclusion founded on content would be unconstitu-
tional, was premised on the assumption that Congress would
forbid the transmission of such matter by other means; that
therefore an exclusion from the mails would amount to a preven-
tion of circulation and an abridgement of the freedom of the
press. This Court, however, disagreed with Calhoun on the
basic assumption.
But we do not think that Congress possesses the power to
prevent transportation in other ways as merchandise, of
matter which it excludes from the mails. To give efficiency
to its'regulations and prevent rival postal systems, it may,
perhaps, prohibit the carriage by others for hire, over postal
routes, of articles which legitimately constitute mail matter
in the sense in which those terms were used at the time the
Constitution was adopted--consisting of letters, and of
newspapers and pamphlets, when not sent as merchandise;
but further than that its power of prohibition cannot
extend.
Thus, the Court leaps over the difficulty presented by the pos-
sibility of the abridging of the freedom of the press. Other
avenues of transmission are open, it says. Such reasoning, it
seems, is a weak evasion of the issue; for the use of other means
of transmission, as was seen in later cases, is, so far as any
pragmatic test is valid, merely a device of logic rather than a
substantial alternative. The real issae in the interpretation of
the Constitutional language was: was this control one of me-
chanical expedition, or might it be used as a means of enforcing
a policy which is attractive to Congress, such as the abolition of
the lottery? These, the language of the Court leaves unanswer-
ed. In fact, however, the decision amounts to an affirmation of
the latter alternative; for the holding of the Court relegates to
"other means of transmission" such matter of which Congress
does not approve; and, as has been stated, this "other means" is
hardly more than a judicial phrase.
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The seriousness and the importance of the Jackson decision
with its implication of a complete right of control must have
been very obvious. When the case of In re Rapier3o was heard,
counsel in extensive briefs pressed upon the Court the conten-
tion that the lottery acts amounted to an abridgement of the
press.
The political censorship of the press perished forever in
England nearly a century before the American Revolution;
no attribute of political sovereignty can be claimed by any
American State which at the time of the Revolution was not
vested either in the Crown or in Parliament. . . The
"freedom of speech or oZ the press" is protected by the First
Amendment subject to all the restraints which the common
law imposed upon that freedom at the time of its adoption.31
It is unfortunate that the Justice to whom the writing of the
opinion was entrusted died before it was transcribed to paper. 32
A very short opinion was rendered, basing the decision chiefly
on the Jackson case and following it. Although in the opinion
the full power of control is recognized to be in Congress, one
limitation is apparently imposed-the "legitimate end."
It is insisted . . . that in order to justify Congress in
exercising any incidental or implied powers to carry into
effect its express authority, it must appear that there is
some relation between the means employed and the legiti-
mate end. This is true, but while the legitimate end of the
exercise of the power in question is to furnish mail facil-
ities for the people of the United States, it is also true the
mail facilities are not required to be furnished for every
purpose.
In this paragraph, the Court intimates a limit to the extent of
control which might be exercised by Congress. The principal
issue in the case, however, was answered by the last quoted
sentence, which, it is submitted, merely begs the question and
does not give any valid reason. Certainly, it is true that the
mails need not be furnished for every conceivable purpose, but
whether it must be furnished for the transmission of all info:-
(1892) 143 U. S. 110.
:' Brief of counsel for petitioner.
:2 The case was heard November 16 and 17, 1891. Justice Bradley died
January 22, 1892. Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the Court.
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mation, within the mechanical limitations, that is the question.
That the Court answers merely by a restatement of it, both in
the above form and later on by saying that Congress may with-
hold the use of a Federal agency for the purpose of the dissemi-
nation of demoralizing matter. Finally, the Court repeated the
basis for the Jackson decision: other means of transmission.
In Public Clearing House v. Coyne,33 Mr. Justice Brown con-
sidered the question at greater length and arrived at the con-
clusion that the postal system is not an indispensable adjunct to
civil government, as is the protection of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, or the defense of the nation. But it is a public function
assumed by Congress and paid for by those using its facilities;
it is presumed to return a revenue, and it operates as a popular
and efficient method of taxation. Therefore, "the legislative
body, in thus establishing a postal service, may annex such con-
ditions to it as it chooses."
It is submitted that the fallacy of such an argument lies in
its failure to consider the fact that the postal service is a monop-
oly; that its function is in every significant aspect that of a pub-
lic utility ;34 that therefore its controlling body, Congress, should
not have the authority "to annex such conditions as it chooses."
The decision follows the lead suggested by the Rapier case and
speaks of the right in Congress to refuse Federal facilities for
the transmission "among its citizens of matter of a character
calculated to debauch the public morale," and apparently settles
any doubt as to the fact of control by Congress.85
33 (1904) 194 U. S. 497. This was a bill in equity by the plaintiff against
the Postmaster of the City of Chicago, praying for an injunction to restrain
him from acting in accord with a fraud order.
3420 Stat. 356 (1879); 35 Stat. 1124 (1909), 18 U. S. C. sees. 304-309(creating a monopoly and punishing any competitive attempts); United
States v. Bromley (1851) 12 How. 88; United States v. Gray (D. C. D.
Mass. 1840) Fed. Cas. 15,253; United States v. Adams (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
1843) Fed. Cas. 14,421.
3Other cases extending the control before the Espionage Act were War-
ren v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1910) 183 F. 718; Lewis Pub. Co. v. Mor-
gan (1913) 229 U. S. 288.
A more nearly logical basis for the Court's holding is to be found in the
Attorney General's brief, where he argues that the Congressional power
over the mails, granted in the same paragraph with the power to coin
money, should be analogous in its scope with the power vested in the
comptroller of the currency by the National Bank Act. Kennedy v. Gibson
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Lotteries, birth-control literature, obscene material-these
had already felt the Congressional arm. Political dissenters
were yet untouched. In 1908, President Roosevelt sent a letter
to the Senate together with an opinion by the Attorney General,
asking for the consideration of a law to prohibit the transmis-
sion through the mail of radical material. The opinion stated
that the transmission of such matter was not then unlawful,
there being no Federal common law. But there was nothing to
prevent Congress from passing a law to make it criminal. 36
For some reason the bill failed. But the opinion of the Attorney
General was, as it was proved in later cases, correct. The
Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 was upheld. In the Schenk
case and others following it, the Court recognized the principles
enunciated in previous decisions. There was no room for escape
except by a reversal of them. These principles, it seems, were
accepted without question, and are most often left practically
without question.
The fact that the power of regulation is in Congress, there-
fore, is inescapable, as a matter of history. The Courts have
declared it to be. Any change must come from the legislative
body, and it is extremely unlikely that that body will deprive
itself of its power. A change in the document which limits the
power of Congress is well nigh impossible. The power is there.
There remains only to be considered: what are its limitations, if
any?
It must be remembered that no precise declaration of the ex-
tent of this power is yet forthcoming. Dicta in cases and dis-
cussions by students are indicative, more nearly, of what the
limitation should be; at best, they are indication of what they
might be, when they are later announced. There is, therefore,
an inevitable overlapping of the moral-imperative, ought, with
dispassionate prophecy.3 7 With such qualification and reserva-
tion must the discussion be resumed.
(1869) 8 Wall. 498; Casey v. Galli (1876) 94 U. S. 673; United States v.
Knox (1879) 102 U. S. 422; Bushnell v. Leland (1897) 164 U. S. 684. The
Court, however, reached its decision without a mention of this point.
36 32 Sen. Doe. No. 426; Chas. J. Bonaparte was the Attorney General.
The President was concerned over an Italian newspaper, "La Sociale,"
which was anarchistic in sentiment, and urged violent action, such as seiz-
ing the police stations and wholesale killings by arms.
37 See, for example, T. Schroeder, The Constitution and Obscenity Postal
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court early recognized the probability of con-
flict between Congressional control of the mails and certain
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 38 The
right of privacy of sealed mail has already been discussed. It
is probably a correct statement of the law today to say that that
right of secrecy of first class mail is superior to the power of
Congress over the postal service. And it is unnecessary to ex-
patiate on the extent of that reservation beyond a mention of the
fact that it leaves free most private communications. Our at-
tention, therefore, is directed to second class mail-newspapers
and periodicals.
The one great limitation on Congressional control, besides the
Fourth Amendment, considered above, is the freedom of the
press. One of the earliest significant cases to reach the Su-
preme Court was.Patterson v. Colorado.39 The defendant had
published a cartoon, with intent to embarrass the State Court in
its functions, and was committed for contempt. An appeal
based on the right of free speech and criticism was taken; the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the State
Court. The decision stated that the object of the First Amend-
ment was "to prevent all such previous restraints upon publica-
tion as had been practiced by other governments"; and it was
not intended to prevent "the subsequent punishment of such as
may be deemed contrary to public welfare." It is significant to
note that two Justices dissented on the ground that the decision
was contrary to the First Amendment. The effect of the opin-
ion was to announce a positive limitation upon the right of pub-
lication. It was no longer possible to vindicate printed matter
merely by pointing to the First Amendment. The opinion, how-
ever, is a little difficult to understand. It professes to permit
publication, subject to punishment. The publisher, in other
Laws (1907) 69 ALBANY L. J., 334, where it is urged that the grant of power
over the postal service must be interpreted to be that power which the Col-
onies exercised over the mails at the time the grant was made, as well as
other meritorious contentions which do not deny Congressional power but
seek to limit it materially. Unfortunately, as later laws and decisions
proved, the writer's prophecies missed widely.3 8 Ex parte Jackson, above; Publishing Co. v. Coyne, above.
s (1907) 205 U. S. 454. Decision based on Com. v. Blanding (1825) 3
Pick. 304; Respublica v. Oswald (Pa. 1788) 1 fall. 319. Followed in
United States v. Toledo Newspaper Co. (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1915) 220 F. 458
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words, has a right to break the laws and submit to the subse-
quent fine or imprisonment. The distinction made, it seems, is
one as to the time when the governmental pressure shall be
brought to bear upon the writer or publisher. Previously, im-
plies the opinion of the Court, the utterance was strangled before
it was heard. Now the speaker is punished afterward. Just
what advantage it may be to the publisher to be impaled on the
latter horn, as contrasted with the former, is difficult to under-
stand. But, however that may be, the freedom of the press re-
ceived a severe blow which made more nearly inevitable the later
decisions in regard to the postal service.
Once the unimpeded right of expression was declared to be
subject to legislative control, the foundation was laid for great
abridgement-legal fiction to the contrary notwithstanding.
The point at which the postal service is concerned in the life of
a newspaper is in its circulation. It is significant to note that
the earlier cases have declared that a denial of the use of the
mails is not an interference with circulation; the necessary im-
plication being that if it were, such a denial would be unconsti-
tutional.40 In the later cases, especially clearly in the dissenting
opinion of the Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson case, it is made
obvious beyond question that the denial of the use of the mails
is an abridgement of the freedom of the press, but that it is justi-
fied.4' By these two methods, aparently directly contrary, the
validity of exclusion legislation has been upheld. 42 It must be
observed that the later cases indicate a healthier attitude, for they
recognize that the exclusion does amount to an abridgement and
must therefore be justified. There is no evasive verbalism, no
fiction based on phrases. It is an abridgement of the freedom
4OEx parte Jackson, In 'e Rapier; Masses Publication Co. v. Patten; Git-
low v. Kiely, above.
41 Publishing Co. v. Coyne, above, and criminal cases under Espionage
Act discussed above. The power of exclusion was declared to be in Con-
gress with the limitations then announced.
42 The following are various instances where the power of exclusion was
applied: Tyomies Pub. Co. v. United States (C. C. A. 6, 1914) 211 F. 385
(obscenity) ; United States v. Journal Co. (D. C. E. D. Va. 1912) 197 F.
415 (obscenity); Branaman v. Harris (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1911) 189 F. 461
(fraud); Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1907) 152 F. 787
(failure to comply with registry requirements of the post office); Homer v.
United States (1892) 143 U. S. 207; Homer v. United States (1892) 143
U. S. 570; Harmon v. United States (C. C. D. Kan. 1891) 50 F. 921.
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of the press, therefore it must have some strong justification-a
conclusion which would not be at all necessary if the Court de-
clared that "other means of transmission" were available.
How far, then, may this exclusion be carried? Certain it is
that Congress may use this power to further any other of its
functions. That was the principle recognized in the definition
given by the Schenck case--"those rights which Congress has
power to protect." For example, there are certain questions
which are recognized to be questions of policy and the Courts
may declare them to be a concern of Congress--as for example,
the army or navy; but a yes or no attitude on that question is be-
yond the reach of the Courts and is the province of the legisla-
tive body. In other words, it seems fairly certain that Congress
would be upheld in drafting the mails as a weapon for its use in
the accomplishing of its rightful duties. But what of the lot-
tery and obscenity exclusions? Is morality the province of the
federal legislature? Whatever the answer to that question, the
Supreme Court has upheld the Congressional assumption of that
power.
If there is any limitation discernible at all, it must be one of
spirit, rather than of definitive language. .
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but are consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion, are Constitutional.4 3
This great principle of interpretation has already found appli-
cation in cases concerning the postal service. In the Rapier
case, the Supreme Court intimated that the power could not be
arbitrarily exercised. There must be some relation between the
means employed and the legitimate end. In the Schenck case,
the holding was that the control over the postal service could be
applied to such matters as are within the power of Congress to
protect. But may not this principle be invoked to prevent any
further control, such as is manifested by the obscenity and lot-
tery acts? Whether or not these latter acts are wise or bene-
ficial is beside the point; and, for the time, that question must be
eschewed in order to prevent a clouding of the real issue: does
43 McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
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Congress have the right to use its exclusion power to further
matters which are beyond its scope? This is not a problem of
obscenity, lotteries, or radical material; this is a question of per-
mitting a practically unlimited federal control or curbing it.
Nor is it exclusively a question of the wisdom of permitting fed-
eral control, but rather one of stirring an awareness of its exist-
ence and probable growth in the future.
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